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Abstract—Health monitoring is important for maintaining reli-
able information and communications technology (ICT) systems.
Anomaly detection methods based on machine learning, which
train a model for describing ”normality” are promising for
monitoring the state of ICT systems. However, these methods
cannot be used when the type of monitored log data changes
from that of training data due to the replacement of certain
equipment. Therefore, such methods may dismiss an anomaly
that appears when log data changes. To solve this problem, we
propose an ICT-systems-monitoring method with deep learning
models divided based on the correlation of log data. We also
propose an algorithm for extracting the correlations of log data
from a deep learning model and separating log data based on the
correlation. When some of the log data changes, our method can
continue health monitoring with the divided models which are
not affected by changes in the log data. We present the results
from experiments involving benchmark data and real log data,
which indicate that our method using divided models does not
decrease anomaly detection accuracy and a model for anomaly
detection can be divided to continue monitoring a network state
even if some the log data change.
Index Terms—health monitoring, anomaly detection, non-
linear correlation, autoencoder
I. INTRODUCTION
Health monitoring is important for maintaining reliable in-
formation and communications technology (ICT) systems. ICT
systems have become more complex and contain more types
of services. Therefore, many types of data to be monitored are
now output from ICT systems. Since it is difficult to configure
the monitoring policy for such complex data with the domain
knowledge of operators, anomaly detection methods based on
machine learning are promising for monitoring the state of
ICT systems. Anomaly detection methods, which train a model
that describes ”normality” from the correlation between the
variables of normal data, are often used for monitoring ICT
systems [1]–[3] because of the imbalance between the amount
of normal data and that of anomaly data and the difficulty of
covering all types of anomaly data [4].
Learning normal correlations of data in such methods is
often achieved through dimensionality reduction for the feature
vectors transformed from raw data. Correlating features can
be represented by fewer latent features and reducing the
dimensions of the feature vectors, therefore, corresponds to
learning the correlations among the dimensions. The feature
vector of test data is evaluated according to if the dimension-
ality reduction by the model trained with only normal data
succeeds. Since calculating dimensionality reduction involves
all dimensions of feature vectors, the dimensions of feature
vectors should be consistent during both training and test.
Let us consider anomaly detection for ICT systems. Since
the pieces of equipment making up an ICT system are con-
nected, the normal correlation of log data from not a piece of
equipment but the entire system should be examined. However,
hardware may be added, reduced, or replaced, and the configu-
ration of software may be changed during system maintenance
in ICT systems and the dimensions of the transformed feature
vectors may change since some of the log data from the
system change in such a case. If the dimensions change, the
trained models for the systems cannot be used for the new data
from the systems. Therefore, ICT systems cannot be monitored
when collecting new data and training a new model. If a failure
occurs during that time, operators may not notice it, which may
lead to serious problems.
To ease the constraint of anomaly detections, we propose
an ICT-system-monitoring method for continuous anomaly
detection even if the dimensions of the vectors change. In this
method, the dimensions of the feature vectors are separated
based on the correlation between them. Then, models for
anomaly detection are built for each group of dimensions.
Dividing a model for anomaly detection based on the cor-
relation prevents the changes in log data occurring due to
local changes in ICT systems from affecting the entire model.
Taking into account the non-linear nature of the monitored
data, we leverage deep neural networks for both separating the
dimensions and building anomaly detection models. We also
propose an algorithm for extracting correlations among the
dimensions from the black-box neural network and separating
the dimensions based on the correlation.
We now discuss related work on calculating correlation
and anomaly detections. There are two types of methods
for calculating the correlation of dimensions: linear and non-
linear. Linear correlation is calculated as a Pearson correlation
coefficient [5]. Non-linear correlation is calculated as a Spear-
man correlation coefficient [5] or, maximal information coef-
ficient [6] or calculated by the Hilbert-Schmidt independence
criterion [7]. Since these methods are used to calculate the
correlation between two dimensions, they require M(M−1)/2
calculations for the number of dimensions of a feature vector:
M . The number of calculations increases explosively for large
dimensional data. As discussed in the following section, our
method can be used to examine the correlation among all
dimensions at once by training deep learning models without
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examining all combinations with training data in order.
Since principal component analysis (PCA) [8] and autoen-
coder (AE) [9] can learn the correlation between the dimen-
sions of feature vectors through dimensionality reduction, both
are used as anomaly detection methods, which train a model
that describes normality. PCA reduces the dimensions based
on linear correlation, whereas AE, which is a deep learning
based method, can reduce the dimensions based on non-linear
correlation [10]. Thus, an AE can detect anomaly data based
on a more complex relation between the dimensions than PCA.
II. PROPOSED METHOD
Our method consists of two parts: separating dimensions
and building models for anomaly detection. In both parts,
an AE is used because considering non-linear correlation is
important for the complex log data from ICT systems, which
have continuous values, such as the use rate of CPUs and
network bandwidth, and discrete values such as the number of
syslog occurrences. We first explain an AE and an anomaly
detection method based on the AE. Then, we explain the pro-
posed algorithm for separating dimensions of feature vectors.
A. Autoencoder
An AE model has two parts of neural networks: encoder
and decoder. The encoder E(·) compresses each input vector
x into a low dimensional representation E(x), and the decoder
D(·) reconstructs each x from E(x) as D(E(x)). An AE
model is optimized to minimize the following loss function.
LAE(x) = 1
M
||x−D(E(x))||2 + λΣN−1l=1 ||W (l)||p, (1)
where ||·||p is the Lp-norm. The second term is a regularization
term to suppress over-fitting for training data and λ is a hy-
perparameter that determines the magnitude of regularization.
B. Anomaly detection with AE
Since an AE model is trained to reconstruct training data,
input similar to training data can be reconstructed well with
the trained AE model. Whereas, the reconstruction error of
input, which differs from that of the training data becomes
large. Thus, the reconstruction error of anomaly data is larger
than that of normal data. The reconstruction error, which
corresponds to the first term of (1), can be assumed as the
anomaly score of input. After the anomaly score of each test
data point is calculated, each data point is classified as normal
or anomaly data with the threshold for the anomaly score.
C. Extracting correlations and separating dimensions
An AE model learns the correlation between the dimensions
of training data to obtain E(x). However, it is difficult to
know which dimensions are correlated from the AE model,
which is a black-box deep learning model. Although many
interpretation models have been proposed [11], there has been
no algorithm for extracting the correlations among the dimen-
sions from an AE model. Therefore, based on our hypothesis
that when a dimension affects the reconstruction of another
dimension in the AE model these dimensions correlate with
each other, we leveraged DeepLIFT [12], an algorithm for
quantifying the influence of input for output, for extracting
these correlations.
DeepLIFT is an algorithm for calculating the importance
score: C∆xi∆y of each dimension i of input x for output
result y with the difference between original input x and
reference input xref . The xref can be determined arbitrarily,
and we define this as zero vectors with the proposed algorithm.
This interpretation algorithm can calculate more interpretable
importance scores than other gradient based algorithms [13],
[14], because it takes into account the global shift in di-
mensions of input. DeepLIFT was used for interpreting the
classification results for the test data of MNIST and Genomics
in [12]. Since we want to know the correlation between
dimensions of training data with our proposed algorithm, we
calculate the importance score of each dimension of input xi
for each dimension of the output of the trained AE model:
x′j = D(E(x))j . The importance score becomes a M ×M
dimensional matrix as follows.
Importance score =
C∆x1∆x′1 C∆x1∆x′2 . . . C∆x1∆x′M
C∆x2∆x′1 C∆x2∆x′2 . . . C∆x2∆x′M
...
...
. . .
...
C∆xM∆x′1 C∆xM∆x′2 . . . C∆xM∆x′M
 (2)
Each column of the matrix represents the magnitude of the
effect of each dimension of input for a dimension of output.
The importance score is then averaged over the training data
by each matrix element. If the absolute value of an element
of the matrix is larger than a predetermined threshold, the
element is replaced with 1; otherwise, with 0. The matrix is
divided into column vectors, and the sets of column vectors
are grouped by column vectors that are not orthogonal to one
another. The column vectors in the same group indicate that
these dimensions of output are reconstructed with the same
input dimensions. Therefore, the dimensions of output in the
same groups are assumed to be correlated with each other.
Finally, the dimensions of the training data are separated
based on the group. For each group, an AE model for anomaly
detection is built and trained again. For each test data point,
the anomaly score is calculated with AE models. If some AE
models cannot be used, the reconstruction error is calculated
only for the dimensions input to the available AE models.
We show the pseudo code of the algorithm for separating
dimensions in Alg.1.
III. EVALUATION
We evaluated the proposed method and algorithm with
the benchmark data of network intrusion detection and real
log data from our virtual network environment, respectively.
We compared the area under receiver operating characteristic
(AUROC) calculated using our divided AE models with that
calculated using one AE model to show our method does not
decrease the AUROC of anomaly detection with benchmark
data. We also evaluated the proposed algorithm with real log
Algorithm 1 Proposed algorithm for separating dimensions
(# means the number of elements in a set.)
Input: Xtrain :training data, τ :threshold,
D(E(·)) :trained AE model
Output: G: sets of groups
1: G := {}
2: R := {} (sets of column vectors)
3: S∆x,∆x′ := 0 (∈ RM×M )
4: cnt := 1
5: calculate (2) with Xtrain and D(E(·)).
6: C∆xi,∆x′j is averaged over training dataset.
7: if |C∆xi,∆x′j | > τ then
8: S∆xi,∆x′j ← 1
9: S′∆x,∆x′ is considered as sets of vectors: S∆x,∆x′i .
10: while #S′∆x,∆x′ > 0 do
11: an S∆x,∆x′i is chosen and deleted from S
′
∆x,∆x′ .
12: if S∆x,∆x′i = 0 then
13: i is input to g0.
14: if g0 /∈ G then
15: g0 is input to G.
16: else
17: i is input to gcnt.
18: rcnt ← S∆x,∆x′i
19: gcnt is input to G.
20: rcnt is input to R.
21: for all S∆x,∆x′j ∈ S′∆x,∆x′ do
22: if S∆x,∆x′j · rcnt 6= 0 then
23: rcnt ← rcnt + S∆x,∆x′j
24: j is input to gcnt
25: S∆x,∆x′j is deleted from S
′
∆x,∆x′ .
26: cnt← cnt + 1
27: while #R > 0 do
28: an ri is chosen and deleted from R.
29: for all rj ∈ R do
30: if ri · rj 6= 0 then
31: gi ← gi ∪ gj
32: gj is deleted from G.
33: rj is deleted from R.
data to confirm if it could separate sets of correlated dimen-
sions qualitatively. Although we did not evaluate anomaly
detection accuracy with real log data since the data under
anomalous situations could not be obtained, anomaly detection
accuracy should be evaluated in future work. Table I shows
the hyperparameters used in the two experiments.
A. Evaluation with network benchmark data
We evaluated the proposed method with the NSL-KDD
dataset [17] to examine how dividing an anomaly detection
model affects the AUROC of anomaly detection.
1) Data: The NSL-KDD dataset contains data for training
(KDDTrain+) and test (KDDTest+), both of which contain
normal and anomaly data. Anomaly data means harmful
flows such as U2R and R2L. We used only normal data
in KDDTrain+ as the training data. Each data point in the
dataset has 34 continuous attributes and 7 discrete attributes.
TABLE I
HYPERPARAMETERS OF AE MODELS USED IN TWO EXPERIMENTS. IN
EXPERIMENT WITH BENCHMARK, WE USED SAME HYPERPARAMETERS
FOR SEPARATION AND ANOMALY DETECTION.
benchmark data real log data
# of epoch 200 1000
# of hidden layers 1 1
ratio of dimensionality reduction
(round up after decimal point of 0.25 0.25
# of dims of hidden layers)
activation function LeakyRelu [15] LeakyRelu
(only use first layer) (α = 0.2) (α = 0.2)
λ (regularization term) 5e-5 (p=1) 5e-5 (p=1)
batch size 1024 16
dropout None None
optimizer Adam [16] Adam
learning rate 1e-3 1e-3
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS WITH NSL-KDD DATA.
# of models
threshold ratio (# of dims of each model) AUROC
0 1 (122) 0.934
0.1 8 (26,1,1,1,12,1,1,79) 0.937
0.3 11 (21,1,1,1,1,5,6,1,1,1,83) 0.935
0.5 12 (17,1,1,1,1,5,5,1,2,1,1,86) 0.929
randomly divide into 8 models 0.924
By representing the discrete attributes as one-hot vectors, we
transformed the data into a set of 122 dimensions vectors.
2) Evaluation methods: We first trained an AE model with
the training data. We then calculated the importance score with
these data. We separated the dimensions with a threshold for
the importance score. The dimensions that were independent
of all the dimensions including themselves were grouped. For
each group, we trained new models for anomaly detection
with the same training data again. Finally, we calculated
the AUROC of the test data with the trained models. We
separated the dimensions with certain thresholds to evaluate
the dependence of the AUROC on separating dimensions.
3) Evaluation results: The results are listed in Table II. We
used (threshold ratio) ∗ (variance of importancescores)
as the threshold. The second column shows the numbers of
models and dimensions of each model with each threshold.
As the threshold increases, the number of models increases
because small importance score elements are ignored for a
large threshold. The second column shows that the number
of dimensions in each model differs because the dependency
between each dimension differs. The last group has the most
dimensions because the values in most dimensions are constant
in the normal data in KDDTrain+.
The AUROC calculated with the proposed method are
compared with that calculated with one AE model (threshold =
0). Table II shows that although the AUROC with AE models
divided randomly is lower than that with one AE model, that
with our method is not lower than that with one AE model
(threshold = 0.1 or 0.3). This indicates that the AE model
for anomaly detection can be divided based on the correlation
without decreasing anomaly detection accuracy.
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Fig. 1. Topology of network used for collecting log data
B. Evaluation with real log data
1) Data: We built a virtual network with virtual machines
(VMs) and virtual LANs (VLANs) as shown in Fig.1. Jmeter
[18] was on each client VM and Apache HTTP Server was
on each web server VM. Each client sent http requests to all
of the web servers. The request frequencies from a client for
all web servers were configured to be about the same values.
There were only http and DNS flows in this network.
We collected flows with L2 switches, MIB data from the
web servers and routers with SNMP trap every minute, and
syslogs from the web servers and routers during two hours.
To input these data for an AE model, we transformed them as
the following. First, the total value of packets (ipkt), that of
bytes (ibyt), that of packets which did not take into account
the difference of the client ports (count) were calculated
for each source IP address (srcIP), destination IP address
(disIP), protocol (ptc) and the port of the web servers or the
dns server every minute. The feature vectors of the flows
had the following dimensions: ”srcIP dstIP ptc (dns|web
server)port (count|ipkt|ibyt)”. Second, the information of
diskIO, interfaceIO, and CPU of the web servers and routers
were collected form the MIB data and transformed into feature
vectors. Third, the syslog appearances were counted every
minute for each web server, router and syslog template ID,
which were extracted using syslog templator [19]. Finally,
these feature vectors were joined. The number of dimensions
of the vectors was 259. That from the flows was 36, that from
the MIB data was 180 and that from the syslogs was 43.
2) Evaluation methods: We trained an AE model with all
collected data, calculated the importance score and separated
the dimensions with certain thresholds. We qualitatively ex-
amined whether correlated dimensions can be grouped.
3) Evaluation results: The separation results were shown
in Table III. When the threshold ratio was 2.0 and 6.0, the
dimensions were separated into 8 and 13 groups, respectively.
The dimensions in the last group are independent of all of the
dimensions in both separation results. These results indicate
that when the threshold ratio is large, the dimensions are finely
separated, because the higher the threshold, the more severe
the grouping decision.
When the threshold was 2, the 1st group was large and
separating dimensions was not very successful. However, when
the threshold was 6, the flow data were separated with each
client’s IP address. The reason is that since the frequencies
TABLE III
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS WITH REAL LOG DATA. EACH ROW INDICATES
SEPARATED MODEL. INTERFACEIO, WEB SERVER, ROUTER, AND CLIENT
ARE ABBREVIATE AS IFIO, SRV, RT AND CLT, RESPECTIVELY.
threshold
ratio detail of model (# of dim)
http flow[all], CPU[srv1,2,3, rt-a,b,c], disk[srv2,3],
ifIO[srv1,2,3, rt-a,b,c], log(”GET HTTP”)[srv1,2,3] (88)
dns flow[clt1→ dnssrv] (3)
2 dns flow[clt2→ dnssrv] (3)
dns flow[dnssrv→ clt1] (3)
disk[srv1,3, rt-a,b,c], CPU[rt-c] (13)
CPU[rt-c] (1)
log(”systemd”) [srv1,2,3] (9)
others (137)
http flow[srv3→ clt1,clt1→ srv3,srv2→ clt1,clt2→ srv3] (12)
http flow[srv3→ clt2] (3)
http flow[srv1→ clt2] (3)
http flow[clt1→ srv2] (3)
http flow[clt2→ srv1] (3)
dns flow[clt1→ dnssrv] (3)
6 dns flow[clt2→ dnssrv] (3)
ifIO[srv2,3, rt-a,b,c] (26)
CPU[srv2,3, rt-a,b,c] (4)
CPU[rt-c] (1)
diskIO[srv-1,3, rt-b,c] (10)
log(”GET HTTP”)[srv1,2,3] (3)
others (185)
of http request from client-1 and client-2 were different, the
flow data from different srcIP were not correlated. These
results indicate that anomaly detection using flow data can
continue when some of the log data change. Contrary, the
MIB data were separated based on the types of data rather
than VMs. The reason is that since the frequencies of http
request for all web servers from each client were about equal
and the MIB data from routers and web servers were affected
by the http requests from both clients, the MIB data from
each piece of equipment were strongly correlated. However,
since each model built with MIB data had only data from
some of the VMs in this case, some models could continue
anomaly detection even if some of the data changed. Finally,
we mention the last model, which had dimensions independent
of all of the dimensions. In this case, we grouped these
independent dimensions. However, since these dimensions
are independent, they can be grouped arbitrarily. If these
dimensions are grouped for every piece of equipment, the
continuity of anomaly detection can be enhanced.
IV. CONCLUSION
We proposed an ICT-system-monitoring method with AE
models divided based on the correlation of monitored data and
an algorithm for extracting the correlations among monitored
data based on a deep learning model. We showed that anomaly
detection accuracy did not decrease when a model was divided
based on the correlation with NSL-KDD data. We also showed
that real log data (i.e. flow, MIB and syslog) were grouped
based on the characteristics of log data and our method could
continue to monitor the network state with some AE models
even if network equipment and log data changed. For future
work, we will evaluate anomaly detection accuracy with our
method, when some of the data actually changes.
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